Fraud continues to represent the most prevalent crime in England and Wales, imposing a substantial financial and societal burden on individuals, businesses and insurers alike. Against that backdrop, the Government’s Fraud Strategy 2026-2029, published in March 2026, signals a renewed commitment to tackling the issue, backed by £250 million of investment over three years.
Structured around three core pillars – Disrupt, Safeguard and Respond – the strategy aims to prevent fraud at source, protect potential victims and improve outcomes for those affected. While these objectives are clearly welcome, from an insurance fraud perspective the more pertinent question is whether the measures outlined will deliver a material reduction in fraud volumes.
Disrupt: Preventing fraud at source
The ‘Disrupt’ pillar places a strong emphasis on prevention, particularly through enhanced use of data, intelligence and technology. The proposed £30 million Online Crime Centre, alongside increased deployment of intelligence-led policing, reflects a growing recognition that fraud is now predominantly a digitally-enabled crime. The strategy’s focus on artificial intelligence and data analytics is also notable, aligning with the direction of travel already seen across the insurance sector.
Insurers have long invested in sophisticated fraud detection capabilities, and the prospect of more coordinated, cross-sector intelligence – including initiatives such as the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s emerging Organised Crime Group Detection Model – is encouraging.
However, the effectiveness of these initiatives will ultimately hinge on meaningful data sharing between sectors. Fraudsters routinely operate across multiple industries, and without a step change in the ability to share intelligence across insurers, banks, retailers and government, opportunities to identify repeat offenders and organised networks will continue to be missed.
Safeguard: Protecting the public and businesses
While these interventions are sensible, they largely build on existing approaches and are unlikely to be transformative in isolation. Of greater concern is the limited focus on the role of online platforms. A significant proportion of fraud now originates through social media, online advertising and messaging services, yet the strategy relies heavily on existing regulatory frameworks, including the Online Safety Act and the Online Fraud Charter.
From an insurance industry standpoint, this risks prolonging a reactive model, where harm is addressed after the event rather than prevented at source. There remains a strong case for more explicit and enforceable obligations on technology companies to identify and remove fraudulent content before it reaches consumers.
Respond: Supporting victims
The ‘Respond’ pillar seeks to address longstanding issues in the treatment of fraud victims. The replacement of Action Fraud with a new Report Fraud service is a particularly important development, given widespread criticism of the previous reporting framework. If implemented effectively, this could improve both intelligence gathering and victim engagement.
The planned introduction of a Fraud Victims’ Charter in 2027, setting out clear standards for response times and victim care, is also a positive step. For insurers, greater clarity and consistency in how fraud cases are handled may help reinforce public confidence in the system, particularly in relation to reimbursement and claims handling.
Structural and legal developments
Beyond the three pillars, the strategy also signals a number of structural and legal reforms. The consolidation of fraud, economic crime and cyber capabilities within the National Police Service and the National Crime Agency should, in principle, enhance coordination and specialist expertise. The exploration of civil penalties as an alternative enforcement mechanism may also provide a more agile route to tackling certain forms of fraud.
In parallel, the introduction of the ‘failure to prevent fraud’ offence in September 2025 is likely to drive improved internal controls within large organisations, including insurers and their supply chains. The Government has also indicated that further calls for evidence will follow, particularly in relation to data sharing, anonymity in communications, and the overall evidence base on fraud – all areas where industry input will be critical.
Ultimately, while the strategy represents a step forward, it does not yet fully resolve some of the structural challenges that enable fraud to flourish. The scale of the problem – costing the UK economy billions each year – raises legitimate questions about whether £250 million is sufficient, particularly in the absence of more decisive action on cross-sector data sharing and platform accountability.
For insurers, who continue to absorb a significant proportion of fraud-related losses, the strategy is a positive signal of intent, but one that will require sustained collaboration between government, regulators and industry to translate into meaningful impact. Further detail on these issues can be found in the full Keoghs article here.